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Privatization – defined here as the transfer of ownership of state-owned organizations to private 
parties – has attracted the attention of scholars across multiple fields. Privatization programs 
have been based on the assumption, grounded in microeconomic theory, that a shift from public 
to private ownership will incentivize more efficient management of available resources. 
However, failure to deliver the expected outcomes in some cases, and the more nuanced 
perspective on state-ownership offered by recent research in management seem to challenge 
this assumption, calling for revisiting this literature. Our comparative review of existing studies 
suggests that the mixed results of privatization programs could be partly explained by what 
was privatized, how it was privatized, and the regulatory regime under which it was privatized. 
By doing so, our review provides conceptual clarity and structure to a rich but fragmented body 
of literature, making seemingly divergent findings more legible, outlining theoretical gaps, and 
identifying avenues for future exploration. 
 





In the last four decades, through the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), governments 
around the world have raised around $3.5 trillion (The PB report, 2017). These divestitures 
were largely based on (or at least justified with) the general assumption that “the government 
is a bad owner” and the consequent belief that a shift from public to private ownership would 
yield efficiency gains (Megginson & Netter, 2001).  
These so-called privatization programs often gave rise to fierce public debates and employee 
strikes (Kaufmann & Siegelbaum, 1997). In the long term, they also produced mixed results 
(Bachiller, 2017), thus reviving a debate among scholars and policy makers about private vs. 
public ownership (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Ford & Plimmer, 2019) and the contextual 
preconditions needed for their success (OECD, 2018). At the same time, rather than 
disappearing, as predicted by some (Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000), many SOEs around 
the world have continued to thrive and are successfully competing with privately-owned ones 
(Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015).  
These observations have led many management researchers to move away from 
microeconomic theories postulating the inherent inefficiencies of SOEs (Laffont & Tirole, 
1991; Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000) towards more nuanced understandings of 
privatization that draw attention to the various benefits of state ownership on capital 
investments (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio 2013), international expansion (Estrin, Meyer, 
Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2016), and innovation (Li, 2011). Such understandings frequently draw 
upon a host of general theories including public goods theory (Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1986), 
agency theory (Meckling & Jensen, 1976), and public choice theory (Dunleavy, 1986), that are 
used to illuminate various implications of private vs. state ownership and control (see the 
Online Appendix for an extensive discussion of these arguments).  
These arguments are generally based on the assumption that publicly vs. privately owned 
organizations differ in their objectives, financing, resourcing, and management practices 
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(Alford, 1993; Harrow & Willcocks, 1990; Ring & Perry, 1985). Privately owned enterprises 
(POEs) are generally assumed to pursue efficiency and prioritize profitability, while SOEs are 
expected to be driven by industrial and social policies, and to be more sensitive to the needs 
and expectations of a wider group of stakeholders. The appointment and compensation of 
managers in POEs, ideally, should reflect primarily their capacity to pursue the economic 
interests of shareholders; in SOEs these decisions often reflect political dynamics and concerns. 
SOEs are also believed to be able to rely, if necessary, on the deep pockets of the state or state-
owned banks to fund long-term investments of uncertain return but deemed of public interests. 
The liquidation of a POE, finally, is determined by market forces (hence the importance of 
maintaining profitability), while for SOEs it is determined by political authorities (possibly 
leading to the long-term survival of otherwise inefficient firms).  
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that, in privatized firms, ownership change did not 
always produce the expected results. In this review paper, we seek to make sense of seemingly 
conflicting findings in prior studies, by re-visiting the empirical and theoretical context in 
which they were carried out and propose a new research agenda based on a revised 
understanding of this highly significant phenomenon.  
PRIVATIZATION: AN OVERVIEW  
The term “privatization” is understood somewhat differently across different academic 
disciplines and institutional settings. Scholars in public administration (Moe, 1987), sociology 
(Marwell, 2004) and political science (Henig, 1990) generally adopt a broad definition, 
encompassing “all the reductions in the regulatory and spending activity of the state” (Savas, 
2000, p.126). In management (Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000), finance (Gupta, 2005) and 
economics (Megginson & Netter, 2001), scholars tend to adopt a narrower definition referring 
exclusively to the “transfer of ownership of state-owned enterprises from the government to 
private parties” (Starr, 1988; Megginson & Netter, 2001). 
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Similarly, in countries characterized by a limited number of SOEs (e.g., the United States), 
privatization is often used to describe activities that many scholars refer to as privatization by 
delegation (Savas, 2000, p.127), understood as the full or partial transfer, to a private entity, of 
a service previously delivered by the government, while retaining oversight of activities and 
results. Delegation is often implemented through contracting out, a form of privatization in 
which local governments outsources to private companies’ services, such as solid-waste 
collection, street repair, street cleaning etc., that were previously provided by public sector 
organizations. Another widely used type of delegation is franchising (Savas, 1992) – a term 
that designates an agreement under which governments award private organizations the (often 
exclusive) right to deliver a regulated service, such as public transportation, previously 
provided by state-run organizations (Yarrow, 1986; Savas, 1992).  
On the other hand, in countries with a tradition of direct intervention of the state in the 
economy (e.g. post-socialist countries, and Western European countries), the term privatization 
often refers to the transfer of the ownership of public organizations from the state to private 
actors – also referred to as privatization through divestment (Savas, 2000, p.127). This usage 
is consistent with early definitions of this term in economics (Yarrow, 1986; Vickers & 
Yarrow, 1991). This type of privatization can vary in degrees, ranging from minority, majority, 
to full privatization – depending on whether the government decides to retain a majority or 
minority stake in the capital, or no stake at all (OECD, 2018).  
Privatization through divestment can be executed using different methods – the most 
common being the full or partial sale of the shares of an SOE to private investors through an 
initial public offering (IPO). This method has received the widest attention as it tends to be 
used for the largest SOEs (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). Other, less common, methods include the 
direct sale (acquisition) of the SOE to a single investor (Bennett, Estrin, Maw & Urga, 2003) 
– favored in countries where capital markets are less developed (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018) – 
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and management or employee buyouts (Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2000), whereby 
the enterprise is sold directly to its employees or (more often) to its managers.  
Divestment could also be accomplished through the donation of shares to particular 
beneficiaries (Savas, 2000, p.129). Employee stock-ownership plans, for instance, are used to 
transfer a percentage of shares to employees (Palcic & Reves, 2011; Wright, Buck, Filatotchev, 
2002), often in conjunction with other privatization methods (e.g. IPOs). Many privatizations 
in central and eastern Europe were conducted by distributing to the general public vouchers 
representing potential shares in the SOEs (Bennet, Estrin, & Urga, 2007; Boycko, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1994). Finally, in rare cases, SOEs may even be donated to key stakeholders (e.g. users 
of the service), usually organized through a non-profit organization or trust (Savas, 2000, 
p.139).  
Theoretically a review could consider the entire body of work on all forms of privatization; 
practically, however, it would be a challenging task. Consistent with the current usage of the 
term in management studies, our review focused on privatization through divestment – 
understood as the full or partial transfer of ownership of state-owned organizations to private 
entities. It spanned, however, several academic disciplines, including management, economics, 
public administration, finance, sociology and political science (see the Online Appendix for 
details of our methodology and the full list of papers we reviewed).  
Our review led us to organize past studies into four broad macro-areas: antecedents 
(literature examining the factors that lead to the decision to privatize), outcomes (literature 
focusing on the outcome of privatization), mediating processes (organizational changes 
associated with privatization that generate the observed outcomes), and moderators (internal 
and external factors that affect its outcomes) (see Figure 1 for an overview). Based on a 
comparison of seemingly divergent findings in each area, we argue that mixed results in prior 
studies can partly be explained by variation in what was privatized (commercial enterprises vs. 
 5 
public service providers), how it was privatized (e.g. fully vs. partially), and the institutional 
context (e.g. regulatory regimes, macroeconomic situation) within which privatization 
occurred. These differences – our review suggests – influence organizational change 
trajectories and the economic outcomes of privatization. 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
ANTECEDENTS: WHY DO GOVERNMENTS PRIVATIZE? 
A stream of research on privatization has focused on its antecedents. Rather than seeking 
empirical support for arguments in favor (or against) privatization, these studies have tried to 
explain what led governments to privatize SOEs in the first place. The factors that they 
identified can be broadly grouped into country-level determinants and firm-level determinants. 
Country-Level Determinants  
As the number of privatizations around the world increased, scholars explored factors that 
explain the relative propensity of governments to privatize. These factors can be broadly 
divided into economic and socio-political.  
Economic factors. Based on the assumption that privatization can be used to lower 
government debt, Ramamurti (1992) showed that privatization was more likely to be pursued 
by governments with higher budget deficits and foreign debt; these were often developing 
economies that had “overused” SOEs in the past – i.e., countries that had introduced state 
ownership with “little justification on economic grounds” (p.229). Likewise, Biglaiser and 
Brown (2003) found that public sector debt significantly increased the rate of privatization in 
Latin American countries. Xu, Tihanyi and Hitt (2017), however, show that negotiations 
between local and central governments has a bearing on privatization decisions: privatization 
is more likely when local fiscal revenues are higher, as their steady budget may grant them 
more discretion to privatize assets.  
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Socio-political factors. Some scholars have drawn attention to political factors that affect 
the likelihood of privatization. Biais and Perotti (2002), for instance, argued that privatization 
programs that allocate shares to middle-class voters can shift support away from left-wing 
parties whose policies might reduce the value of shareholdings. However, if privatizations are 
unpopular among voters, governments may be more reluctant to pursue them, especially in the 
presence of strong oppositions, or when firms are located in areas where political authorities 
cannot afford to lose consensus (Dinc & Gupta, 2011). Other studies suggest how these 
decisions are affected by various forms of social influence. For instance, governments tend to 
emulate the privatization strategies of neighboring countries (Schmitt, 2011; Breen & Doyle, 
2013) or countries they perceive as similar (Fink, 2011). Similarly, multilateral agencies, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (Kentikelenis & Babb, 2019), seem to influence decisions 
to privatize (Henisz, Zelner, & Guillén, 2005; Breen & Doyle, 2013).  
Firm-Level Determinants  
Based on the economic assumption that the primary purpose of privatization is to increase 
the efficiency of SOEs, some scholars have argued that low-performing SOEs are more likely 
to be privatized (Ramamurti, 1992; Guo & Yao, 2005) because governments are unwilling or 
unable to provide the investments and close monitoring required to restore profitability in these 
companies (OECD, 2018). These arguments often cite research showing that the most 
inefficient firms experience the greatest improvements in efficiency (Claessens, Djankov, & 
Pohl, 1997; Frydman, Gray Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1999). Governments concerned with 
maximizing efficiency – these studies conclude – should privatize the least efficient firms first.  
In fact, other studies show that better performing SOEs are more likely to be privatized than 
worse performing ones (Dinc & Gupta, 2011; Xu et al., 2017), suggesting that increasing 
efficiency is just one of several competing objectives for a government to pursue: while 
privatizing the best performing enterprises may be inconsistent with this objective, it may help 
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maximize revenues earned from privatization and minimize the political cost of unemployment 
(Gupta, Ham, & Svejnar, 2008).  
PRIVATIZATION OUTCOMES: HOW DOES PRIVATIZATION INFLUENCE 
ORGANIZATIONS? 
Arguments for privatization have been largely based on the assumption that a shift from 
state to private ownership would reorient managers towards the maximization of shareholders’ 
wealth, which in turn will increase the efficiency of operations (Megginson & Netter, 2001, 
2003; Vickers & Yarrow, 1991; see Online Appendix for more details). It is not surprising, 
then, that – as we discuss in this section – a large number of studies have explored how 
privatization influences financial and/or operating performance, trying to corroborate (or 
possibly disprove) arguments based on micro-economic theories. At the same time, others have  
examined other potential outcomes of privatization – such as quality of service, innovation 
internationalization, or employment levels.  
Financial and Operational Performance  
To date, more than 80 studies, the vast majority of which are grounded in agency theory, 
have empirically tested the impact of privatization on the financial performance of enterprises. 
Among these, earlier ones sought to compare the performance of state-owned companies and 
private companies (not – importantly – privatized ones). Some studies used single-country (e.g. 
Majumdar, 1996; Tian, 2000) or single-industry samples (e.g. Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, 
& Lutter; 1994; Galal, Jones, Tandon, & Vogelsang, 1994) to examine costs and productivity 
growth of private and state-owned firms over a period, while others used multi-industry and 
multi-national time-series comparisons to analyze correlations between state and private 
ownership and efficiency (e.g. Boardman & Vining, 1989, Frydman et al., 1999). Collectively, 
these studies seemed to support economic arguments for privatization by pointing to the 
superior performance of private vs. state-owned enterprises. Their methodology, however, has 
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been criticized (e.g. Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, & Svejnar, 2009; Megginson & Netter, 2001), 
because single-industry studies included samples from different countries, but did not control 
for country-level differences (e.g. level of economic development) that might have influenced 
the performance of enterprises. Direct comparisons between public and private firms might 
also have been biased by endogeneity and selection effects, as factors that determine the choice 
to privatize a firm could also influence performance (Gupta et al., 2008). For instance, single-
country studies may fail to consider that in certain industries, firms may be owned by the state 
because of market failure (Megginson & Netter, 2001) and the choice of public vs. private 
ownership itself is endogenous to both political (e.g. provision of free public services) and 
performance goals (Megginson & Sutter, 2006). Conscious of these methodological issues, 
later studies (e.g. Goldeng, Grunfeld, & Benito, 2008; Hartley & Medlock, 2013) were not 
presented explicitly as research on the outcome of privatization, but only mentioned the indirect 
relevance of their findings for scholars interested in privatizations.  
A second group of studies examined more directly the impact of privatization on 
performance, by comparing performance data (e.g. sales, income) pre- and post- privatization. 
Most of these studies compared performance before and after the initial public offering (IPO) 
in share-issue-privatizations (e.g. Munir & Naqvi, 2017). Research using this approach either 
focused on specific industries (e.g. D’Souza & Megginson, 1999) or countries (e.g. Maquieira 
& Zurita, 1996; Sun & Tong, 2003), or used a sample that combined multiple industries and 
countries (Megginson, Nash, & van Randenborgh, 1994). Other scholars focused on specific 
types of divestment such as direct sale to private investors (e.g. Uhlenbruck & Castro, 1998, 
2000) and voucher privatizations (e.g. Boycko et al., 1994; Nelson & Kuzes, 1994).  
This second group of studies offers a more mixed portrayal of the impact of privatization on 
performance. While most studies point to improvements in company performance post-
privatization, several others question this idea1 (Bachiller, 2017; Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; 
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Megginson, 2017). A comparative analysis of this work suggests that these results can be partly 
explained by the characteristics of the industry (in particular, the relative competitiveness of 
the market), by the method that was used to privatize, and by the institutional context within 
which privatization took place. 
Market competitiveness (after privatization) and post-privatization performance. 45 
of the 81 papers that empirically tested the privatization-performance relationship used samples 
of firms from multiples industries without considering the potential influence of industry-
specific factors on performance. A closer examination of the remaining 36, however, reveals 
that research showing improved financial performance was mostly conducted on privatized 
commercial enterprises operating in competitive markets (e.g. Boubakri, Cosset, Fischer, & 
Guedhami, 2005; Megginson & Netter, 2001). This was the case, for instance, of all the twelve 
studies investigating the banking sector (e.g. Azam, Biais, & Dia, 2004; Bonin, Hasan, & 
Wachtel, 2005), and the majority of research on the privatization of manufacturing firms (e.g. 
Xia & Walker, 2015), airlines (e.g. Eckel, Eckel, & Singal,1997) and pharmaceutical 
companies (e.g. Xu et al., 2017).  
In contrast, research on the privatization of former public-service providers, such as 
electricity (e.g. Balza, Jimenez, & Mercado, 2013; Kirkpatrick, Parker, & Zhang, 2006), 
telecom (e.g. Bortolotti, D’Souza, Fantini, & Megginson, 2002; Gasmi, Maingard, Noumba, & 
Virto, 2013), and water (e.g. Ogden & Watson, 1999; Estache & Rossi, 2002) displayed mixed 
results. A study of privatized Colombian power generators, for instance, found that, once other 
factors were accounted for, performance improvement was not systematically associated with 
ownership change (Pombo & Ramirez-Gomez, 2005). While Newbery and Pollitt (1997) found 
improvements in the performance of privatized electricity utilities in the UK, a comprehensive 
analysis of 36 countries, showed no significant improvements (Zhang, Parker, & Kirkpatrick, 
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2008). Similarly, while Sueyoshi (1998) highlighted enhanced performance in the telecom 
sector, Wallsten (2001) found that privatization had few benefits.   
These observations suggest that post-privatization, firms operating in markets where a 
combination of technological affordances and regulatory provisions ensure intense competition 
can no longer count on the state to buffer the impact of inefficiencies and need to restructure 
their operations and improve their performance if they want to survive. Conversely, where 
technological constraints or political support enables the newly privatized firm to continue 
operating de facto in conditions of monopoly or quasi-monopoly, there will be fewer incentives 
to improve. In the absence of structural and regulatory conditions to enable and stimulate 
competition, ownership change alone may be insufficient to foster efficiency gains, which may 
explain why some privatizations seem to be more successful than others on this front (Vining 
& Bordman, 1992; Uhlenbruck & Castro, 2000).   
Not all governments, however, have been equally successful at creating a competitive 
environment. In the case of electricity, for instance, some governments granted independent 
agencies executive powers of setting tariffs and regulating entry, generally leading to 
performance improvements in privatized firms (Bortolotti et al., 2002; Cubbin & Stern, 2006). 
Conversely, to the extent that governments continued to consider certain industries, such as 
water supply, of public interest, and enforced strict regulatory regimes to assure the quality and 
accessibility of the service, privatized enterprises enjoyed less discretion to refocus their 
objectives and reconfigure their operations to increase profitability. At the same time, Munir 
and Naqvi’s (2017) study of the privatization of banks in Pakistan shows how an excessively 
lax regulatory regime may not be desirable either, as it may allow privatized firms to increase 
their profitability at the expense of public good.  
Privatization method and post-privatization performance. Some degree of divergence 
in findings is also explained by the method used to privatize. Past studies have examined 
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various methods of transferring public ownership, such as IPO (e.g. D’Souza, Megginson, & 
Nash, 2005; Vaaler & Schrage, 2009), acquisitions (e.g. Meyer, 2002; Uhlenbruck & Castro, 
2000), and vouchers (e.g. Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Harper, 2002). A comparison of studies 
exploring different methods suggests that privatization through IPO seems to show stronger 
improvements in financial performance than other methods (Bachiller, 2017; Estrin et al, 
2009)2. Scholars have explained this observation with the beneficial effects of the discipline of 
capital markets (Jones, Megginson, Nash, & Netter, 1999), arguing that where capital markets 
are well-functioning (Megginson, 2005) the threat of takeover will lead to increased managerial 
effort and accountability (Arcas & Bachiller, 2010; D’Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2001). The 
fact that these conditions are not always met may partly explain the observed variance in the 
comparative performance of privatization through IPO. A study of transitional economies, for 
instance, showed how – when capital markets are relatively underdeveloped – this method may 
not deliver significantly better results than others (Bennett et al., 2007).  
Institutional context and post-privatization performance. Mixed results about the 
comparative superiority of IPOs point to a third factor potentially influencing the privatization-
performance relationships, that is the characteristics of the institutional context in which 
privatization occurred.  
Early studies examined privatizations in the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher (e.g. 
Martin & Parker, 1995; Morley, 1986), then continental Europe (e.g. Berne & Pogorel, 2006; 
Dyck, 1997) and Latin America (e.g. Aggarwal, Leal, & Hernandez, 1993; Wallsten, 2001), 
followed by the transition to capitalism in Russia (e.g. Earle & Estrin, 2003; Jones, 1998; 
Sachs, 1992) and other Central-Eastern European countries (e.g. Harper, 2002; Smith, Cin, & 
Vodovopivec, 1997), and, more recently, China (e.g. Huang & Wang, 2011; Liao, Liu, & 
Wang, 2011;  Sun & Tsong, 2003). 
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Scholars usually distinguished these contexts in terms the level of economic development 
of the country (Ramamurti, 2000; Megginson & Sutter, 2006), thus contrasting “developed” 
(D’Souza et al., 2005), and “developing” (Megginson & Sutter, 2006) or “transitional” 
economies (Estrin et al., 2009). Some scholars argued that in developing economies, 
underdeveloped institutional infrastructure, governance mechanisms, and property rights 
enforcements may prevent private ownership to fully display its beneficial effects (Dharwadkar 
et al., 2000; Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, 2003). A recent meta-analysis 
(Bachiller, 2017), however, noted that privatized companies actually seem to perform better in 
developing rather than developed economies, possibly because of the benefits of no longer 
being under the influence of intrusive or resource-deprived governments. 
Given that variation in results – even within developed and developing countries – is 
substantial, this classification may be failing to capture important contextual differences. In 
fact, research in institutional economics (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and international business 
(Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018) points out that the variety of (capitalist) 
economic systems is far more nuanced. Our review suggests that this variety may influence the 
outcome of privatization by affecting organizational processes leading to change (or lack 
thereof) in managerial behavior, and the impact of choices about the method and degree of 
privatization, which prior research highlighted as important moderators of the privatization-
performance relationship. Because of this reason, we discuss the influence of the institutional 
context in greater detail when presenting these two macro-areas of research. 
Service Quality 
The general argument in favor of state-ownership of utilities like electricity, railway and 
water providers is that governments could use it to address market failures that may lead to the 
suboptimal provision of these essential services. Despite this fact, proponents of privatization 
have argued that the inherent inefficiency of SOEs is often so high that a shift to private 
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ownership would not only lead to higher financial performance, but also to higher service 
quality. For instance, Ogden and Watson (1999) claimed that, when water supply was 
privatized in the UK, improving service quality initially affected negatively current profits, but 
shareholder returns eventually increased in the long term.  
Most studies, however, question the idea that privatization had any impact on service 
quality, and argue instead that improvements in quality are related instead to better regulation 
(Dore, Kushner and Zummer, 2004; Estache, Rossi, & Ruzier, 2004; Silvestre, Hall, Matos, 
Figueira, 2010). For instance, Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang (2006) found no significant 
quality differences between state-owned and privatized water providers in Africa. Similarly, 
research on privatized electricity providers (e.g., Bortolotti, Fantini, & Sinascalco, 1998; 
Zhang, Parker, & Kirkpatrick, 2008) showed that market liberalization and effective regulation, 
rather than privatization per se, led to an in increase in quality and output of electricity 
generation. To do so, these studies argued, it is important to develop an independent regulator 
(Spiller, 1996), unbundle generation from transmission (Pollitt, 2008) and expand legal access 
to the transmission network (Bortolotti et al., 2002). These observations are in line with Hart, 
Shleifer & Vishny’s (1997) argument that, if contracts are incomplete – because the quality of 
service a government wants can never be fully specified – private providers of public services 
may tend to reduce cost (and quality) excessively because they ignore the adverse effect of 
non-contractible quality (see Online appendix). 
It is also important to note that the nature of the certain services restricts the potential for 
competition, which scholars consider essential to induce providers to improve quality in order 
to attract customers (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). While technological advancements have enabled 
competition in services like telecommunications and electricity, it is less possible to do so in 
services like water provision. In these cases, scholars have argued for the importance of 
competitive processes to win contracts or concession agreements (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018), 
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and warned about the high transaction costs that may be associated with contracting the 
provision of services in what are essentially monopolistic conditions (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). 
Innovation  
Industrial policy arguments in favor of state ownership highlighted the benefits of the deep 
pockets of the state for research and development, especially in areas where discovery costs 
are high (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014, p.59). Research has shown, however, that newly 
privatized firms often reduce the amount of resources devoted to R&D, while at the same time 
increasing the efficiency of their research, measured in terms of the amount and quality of the 
patents they produce (Munari & Oriani 2005; Munari, Roberts & Sobrero 2002; Munari & 
Sobrero 2003). These results have been explained by the argument that a shift from state to 
private ownership would lead to a reorientation of R&D programs toward innovation outputs 
that are commercially more applicable (Belloc, 2014). Importantly, however, research has also 
shown that privatization may not have an immediate impact on R&D performance, but this 
impact may manifest over a long period of time (Munari & Oriani, 2005).  
Internationalization 
Some privatization proponents argued that the transformative changes and entrepreneurial 
mindset brought about by privatization will actually foster investments in innovation to support 
strategic change and internationalization (Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). Indeed, 
when, in Europe, the telecommunications sector was privatized through the 1980s and 1990s, 
a number of prior SOEs emerged as large multinational players (Bortolotti et al., 2002). A study 
of the 22 largest telecom companies in the OECD, however, found that private ownership did 
not significantly explain internationalization patterns (Alonso, Clifton, Diaz-Fuentes, 
Fernandez-Gutierrez, & Revuelta, 2013). A similar study of the electricity and telecom sectors 
in the EU found no support for the relationship between privatization and internationalization 
(Clifton, Diaz-Fuentes & Revuelta, 2010). These findings, therefore, seem to contradict 
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arguments advanced by both scholars (Zahra et al., 2000) and policymakers (OECD, 2003), 
and suggest instead that, to the extent that a state-owned firm operates in a competitive market, 
its propensity to internationalize will be comparable to privately-owned ones. 
Employment  
Finally, some studies tested the implicit prediction from agency theory that privatization 
would lead to lower employment levels, because – no longer constrained by social and political 
goals – privatized firms would be free to operate more efficiently and eliminate excess 
workforce (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014, p.36; Hodge, 2000, p.44). Research findings, again, 
are mixed. Bhaskar and Khan (1995), for instance, found that privatization of the jute industry 
in Bangladesh significantly decreased employment levels. Similarly, La Porta and Lopez-de-
Silanes (1999) found that, in Mexico, privatized firms reduced employment by half, while the 
remaining workers saw a significant pay rise. In contrast, Gupta (2011) showed that, in India, 
privatization significantly increased employment in the long run and was not associated with 
decline in employee compensation. Similarly, a global sample of companies privatized in the 
1980s, also presented an increase in employment levels (Megginson et al., 1994).  
A potential explanation for such mixed findings could be found in unmeasured 
contingencies and the temporal lag of such studies. For instance, Hodge (2000) points out that 
Megginson and colleagues (1994) did not control for the fact that the significant increase in 
headcount at British Airways was due to the acquisition of a large competitor. This suggests 
that, even if employment levels initially drop as privatized firms restructure and streamline 
operations, they may eventually recover, spurred by commercial success and growth strategies 
(Estrin & Pelletier, 2018) as these firms become more efficient and alert to entrepreneurial 




MEDIATING PROCESSES OF PRIVATIZATION 
Research on the outcomes of privatization did not really investigate internal consequences 
of the sale of state-owned organizations to private investors. To the extent that private 
ownership seemed to be associated with higher performance, they assumed that changes in goal 
setting, incentive systems, and decision-making reflected predictions from micro-economic 
theory. Spurred by the apparent inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed 
outcomes, a third group of studies, often using qualitative methods, examined more closely the 
organizational changes that privatization brought about in formerly state-owned firm. We refer 
to these studies as investigating mediating processes, because they helped illuminate how the 
transfer of ownership from the state to private entities produced the observed outcomes by 
affecting incentive systems, managerial attitudes, organizational structure and culture. While 
some of these studies supported the idea that privatization would realign incentive systems 
(e.g., Rodríguez et al., 2007), change organizational culture (e.g., Ross, 2008), and stimulate 
entrepreneurial orientation (e.g., Wu et al., 2008), others reported cases in which privatization 
had only a limited impact on the organization. 
Change in Incentive Systems  
Agency theory posits that a shift from state to private ownership would change the structure 
of incentives within the organization. In support to this theory, Rodriguez, Espejo and Cabrera 
(2007) showed how changing agency relations led to redesign incentive system in a privatized 
Spanish electricity provider, increasing the relevance of profitability and financial control. A 
study of UK privatized firms similarly revealed substantive changes in managerial incentives 
after these firms transitioned to private ownership (Cragg & Dyck, 2003).  
Other studies, however, question the assumptions of agency theory. Two separate studies of 
privatized Hungarian enterprises, for instance, showed that private owners would not 
necessarily implement radically different incentive policies from state controllers (Whitley & 
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Czaban, 1998, Czaban & Whitley, 2000). Uncertainty around state policies on privatization, 
the authors argued, limited the capacity for major structural and strategic change in privatized 
organizations, and the new owners were hesitant to delegate major responsibilities until they 
developed a better understanding of the privatized organization and trust in their managers. 
Change in Management 
Early research on privatization assumed that transferring ownership from public to private 
would lead to better management, as new managers would be more competent and 
commercially oriented (Ogden, 1995). For instance, by studying privatizations in Taiwan, Wu, 
Su and Lee (2008) found that privatization led to an increased entrepreneurial orientation 
among employees. However, when studying privatized Czech organizations, Soulsby and 
Clark (1996) observed that, although Czech managers were influenced by commercially 
oriented western-style management practices, their behavior also reflected a strong national 
identity and a certain suspicion towards foreign business, as new managerial ideas were filtered 
through the lens of the emerging post-communist management. Similarly, a study of the UK 
railway industry showed that, despite the prediction that privatization would lead to a “new 
breed” of managers (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny,1996), the attitudes that characterized 
managers hired after the privatization and those that had been employed before did not differ 
much (Pendleton, 2003). The design of the study, however, cannot exclude that this similarity 
is due to veteran managers having changed their attitudes after privatization, or managers more 
critical of privatization having left after the change (hence not being captured by the study). 
 Change in Culture  
Arguments grounded in institutional theory propose that moving from state to private 
ownership would eventually introduce profound cultural changes, reflecting new conventions 
about the appropriate way to manage and govern an organization (Johnson et al., 2000). Indeed, 
a study of the privatization of Czech telecom operators revealed how, despite initial resistance 
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by employees, privatization led indeed to change in organizational culture, thanks to the 
introduction of a new bonus systems, department restructuring, and workforce training (Ross, 
2008). Similarly, Cunha and Cooper (2002) found that the privatization of three Portuguese 
firms led to “greater emphasis on performance, people orientation and organizational 
integration” (p.21.). On the other hand, research on the privatization of Czech state-owned 
enterprises (Clark & Soulsby, 1995) highlighted the difficulties that managers encountered in 
breaking away from the cultural legacy of the past.  Although organizational restructuring 
towards a divisional, decentralized structure was supported by a major investment in 
information technology, both senior and middle managers continued to operate with the 
hierarchical, top-down approach that had permeated the culture before privatization.  
Change in Organizational Structure  
Early privatization literature assumed that the sale to private investors would improve the 
organizational structure of “slow” and inefficient SOEs (e.g., Hammer, Hinterhuber, & Lorenz, 
1989) by making it more decentralized (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000), less hierarchical (Soulsby 
& Clark, 1996) and more streamlined (Filatotchev, Buck, Zhukhov, 2000). Other studies, 
however, have questioned the necessity of ownership change to carry out such restructuring. 
Research shows that many privatized SOEs were really restructured prior to the actual 
privatization, which induced some scholars (e.g., Parker, 1997) to argue that the assumed 
benefits of privatization were evident even before the actual sale of an enterprise. For instance, 
a longitudinal study of the UK rail services showed that organizational change and performance 
improvements not only preceded the transfer of the railways from public to private ownership 
but were also a pre-requisite, without which privatization would have been less feasible for the 
government (Tyrrall & Parker, 2005). 
Institutional logics, market competitiveness (prior to privatization), and 
organizational change. Research exploring mediators in the influence of privatization has 
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shown that former SOEs do not always change in ways predicted by micro-economic theories. 
When discussing research on post-privatization performance, we mentioned how market 
competitiveness after privatization seemed to positively influence financial and operating 
performance by incentivizing managers to pursue efficiency and profitability and enabling 
them to reap the benefits of improved quality. Not all newly privatized firms examined by prior 
studies, however, were equally used to operating in a competitive environment: while some 
had been operating in liberalized markets prior to privatization (e.g., Graham, 1997), others 
faced competition only after privatization, as their markets were deregulated and opened up to 
new entrants (e.g., Bognetti & Obermann, 2008). Prior exposure to market competition, we 
suggest, may help explain why some formerly state-owned firms seem to be more receptive to 
organizational change than others.  
Despite Vickers and Yarrow’s (1991) early call to differentiate the analysis of privatizations 
based on the type of organization that was privatized, past studies rarely distinguished between 
the privatization of commercial enterprises operating in competitive markets and the 
privatization of public service providers. By commercial SOEs, we refer to organizations like 
banks (Bonin et al., 2005), industrial manufacturers (Gupta, 2005), or airlines (Al Jazzaf, 1999) 
that, for historical reasons, were state-owned, but operated in competitive markets. By public 
service providers, we refer to organizations – such as postal services, health care organizations, 
or electricity providers – that, for a combination of political choices, cultural, technical and 
economic factors, operated in non-market conditions and were generally regarded locally (and 
frequently regarded themselves) as delivering services deemed of public utility. 
A comparison of 22 past studies suggests that this distinction may in fact help explain 
variation (or lack thereof) in change trajectories. The majority of research on the effect of 
privatization in commercial enterprises such as manufacturing firms, airlines and banks (e.g., 
Cunha & Cooper, 2002; Wu et al., 2008; Grugulis & Wilkinson, 2002) seems to support the 
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prediction that privatization would lead to significant structural and cultural changes (Zahra et 
al, 2000). In contrast, research on privatized public-service providers, such as railways, 
electricity providers and water providers (Crockford, 1994; Pendleton, 2003; Tyrrall & Parker, 
2005; Dean, Carlisle, & Baden‐Fuller, 1999) frequently reported how privatization had limited 
impact on the internal administrative systems and operations.  
An institutionalist perspective on privatization (see Online Appendix) may help us interpret 
these divergent patterns. According to institutional theorists, SOEs tend to be managed 
according to coherent sets of principles – which they refer to as “templates” (Johnson et al., 
2000) or, more recently, “logics” (Greve & Man Zhang, 2017) – that differ from those followed 
by private companies. State-owned firms, for instance, tend to pursue a broad range of goals, 
and prioritize access to service over profit margins and job creation over efficiency; political 
loyalty may also be a requirement for top positions. These differences reflect the fact that the 
former operate within the broader normative order of the state, whereas the latter are subjected 
to the broader normative order of the market (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
Early research assumed that all state-owned organizations operated under a state (or public-
sector) logic, while privately-owned ones followed a market (or business) logic (Bruton, 
Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010), and that, after a temporary co-existence in the aftermath of 
privatization, the old public sector template would be replaced by a new business-oriented one 
(Johnson et al., 2000). In fact, recent research on SOEs suggests that, to the extent that these 
organizations operate as commercial enterprises in competitive markets (e.g. airlines 
companies, oil producers, etc.), their operations seem to follow a hybrid template that combines 
elements of state and market logics (Bruton et al., 2015; Koppell, 2007). This can be explained 
by their operating at the intersection of the two institutional orders of the state (because of their 
ownership) and the market (because of the structure of the industry they operate in). 
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If we accept this idea, we can explain the comparatively higher propensity of privatized 
firms used to operating in competitive markets to embrace incentive systems, structures and 
behavior geared to maximize efficiency and profitability, with their pre-existing exposure to a 
market logic, and with the partial incorporation of this logic in their operations prior to 
privatization (Johnson et al., 2000). Their familiarity with both logics makes it comparatively 
easier for them to increase emphasis on a market logic and de-emphasize a state one, making 
them more receptive to privatization-related changes. Their cultural repertoire already includes 
the resources required to operate under a market logic; they simply have to shed the structures 
and practices that were in place to attend to the expectations of their public owner and refocus 
their operations to the exclusive pursuit of business goals. In contrast, in the absence of prior 
exposure to market competition, public-service providers, used to operate according to a state 
logic, may be less receptive to the new logic they are expected to attend to after privatization. 
Economics systems, institutional context, and organizational change after 
privatization. An institutional perspective may also help explain different change patterns in 
terms of the broader institutional context within which privatized companies operate. One 
could argue, for instance, that change in managerial practices after privatization is predicated 
on the availability of qualified managers, used to operate in a market environment, that can be 
recruited from the private sector (Al-Husan & James, 2003; Meaney, 1995; Whitley, 
Henderson, Czaban, 1997) or at least on the accessibility of alternative templates for the 
incumbent managers (for instance, through education, training, professional advice or other 
structures through which managerial templates are diffused). While these conditions may be 
present in developed market economies, they may not be so in transitional and/or developing 
economies – where indeed privatization is an important step to create a market economy. This 
may partly explain the delayed adaptation of structure, systems, and management in privatized 
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firms observed by some studies in these countries (Soulsby & Clark, 1996; Clark & Soulsby, 
1995; Whitley & Czaban, 1998).  
As noted earlier, however, distinguishing between developed and developing (or 
transitional) economies comes with its limitations. A more nuanced way to describe the 
institutional environments of developed economies proposes to distinguish between liberal 
market economies (LMEs) (e.g., US, UK, Canada, Australia) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) (e.g. France, Germany, Japan, Sweden), based on the dynamics of five 
spheres: industrial relations, vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, 
and relations among employees (Hall & Soskice, 2011)3.  
These differences, we argue, may partly explain different change patterns observed by prior 
studies. For instance, our review highlights that studies conducted on privatization in LMEs 
suggest that – despite initial resistance – employees are ultimately more receptive of changes 
associated with privatization (Carter & Mueller, 2002; Mackenzie, 2008). In contrast, a study 
of the privatization of France Telecom – a company operating in a CME – showed how changes 
associated with privatization resulted in continued resistance, and that “the implementation of 
a profit-oriented financialization strategy” led to an “unforgiving environment”, which resulted 
in 69 employee suicides, with many of them leaving notes “blaming management for having 
privileged interests of shareholders over those of employees” (Chabrak, Craig, & Daidj, 2016). 
A potential explanation for these differences could be found, in particular, in the spheres 
of industrial relations and vocational training. The combination of trade union strength and low 
transferability of skills, in particular, could explain stronger resistance to privatization in 
CMEs. While, in LMEs, trade unions may be weakened by business and deregulation 
initiatives, they remain very influential in CMEs, where cross-class coalitions help preserve 
some degree of wage coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001). This idea is corroborated by 
research showing that the strength of unions tends to increase resistance to change, particularly 
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in cases of radical changes like privatization (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). Moreover, in 
contrast to workers in LMEs, who focus on developing highly transferable skills (due to lower 
employment protection), workers in CMEs focus on firm‐ and industry‐specific skills, which 
may increase their anxiety in the face of change that may threaten their job security.   
MODERATORS: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE PRIVATIZATION OUTCOMES 
Studies that have examined explicitly conditions that may explain different privatization 
outcomes point in particular to two factors: the quality of institutions and the post-privatization 
ownership structure (that is who the new owners are and how much capital they control). 
Institutional quality  
With mass-privatization programs in emerging/transitional economies not producing the 
outcomes that were originally promised, several scholars explored the moderating role that the 
quality of the institutional environment, in terms of governance mechanisms and political 
influence on business, has on the functioning and performance of organizations.  
Governance Mechanisms. Dharwadkar, George and Brandes (2000) theorized that 
weak internal or external governance mechanisms – which are common in emerging economies 
– make traditional solutions to agency problems less effective, because they enable majority 
owners to disregard the interest of minorities. Under these conditions, concentration of 
ownership in the hands of managers may enable them to pursue their own personal interests to 
the detriment of profitability. Only dominant external owners, such as institutional investors or 
foreign multinationals, may enforce effective control systems that mitigate agency problems.  
Peng, Buck, and Filatotchev (2003) similarly found that governance mechanisms such as 
outside directorship and the replacement of inefficient managers may be less effective than 
expected in driving post-privatization performance, as their effectiveness may be blunted by 
particular characteristics of the institutional environment. In particular, they observe that, in 
Russia, significant barriers to share transfers made minority shareholders represented on the 
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board unable to push large scale restructuring and overcome the reluctance of managers – even 
those recruited post privatization – characterized by a collectivist mentality.  
Political Influence. Although early work on privatization (Yarrow, 1986) argued that the 
process would lead to “depoliticization”, much empirical research suggests otherwise, as the 
maintenance of close relationships between privatized firms’ managers and politicians seems 
to be a global phenomenon, across sectors and privatization methods (Boubakri, Cosset, & 
Safar, 2008; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Parker & Sall, 2003). It is not uncommon, research 
shows, that politicians and government bureaucrats continue to influence the governance of 
privatized firms, even after privatization, either through formal (state regulation) or informal 
channels (personal ties with managers).  
This phenomenon has been shown to have a negative effect on the performance of former 
SOEs. Boubakri and colleagues (2008), for instance have shown that the presence of politicians 
in the board of privatized firms seems to negatively affect financial performance, possibly 
because these directors use their position to press managers towards the continued pursuit of 
political goals (Boubakri et al., 2008). Similarly, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) found that 
newly privatized Chinese firms with politically connected CEOs underperformed those without 
politically connected CEOs by almost 18% (based on 3-year post-IPO returns); they explained 
this result with the tendency of politically connected CEOs to appoint other bureaucrats to key 
managerial positions, rather than managers with relevant professional experience. 
Post-privatization ownership structure 
Earlier, we observed that apparent discrepancies among the observed outcome of 
privatization around the world – or even in the same country – can be partly explained by the 
method used to divest. Privatizations, however, also differ in the degree to which capital is 
transferred to private investors (ranging from partial to full privatization) (Ramamurti, 2000), 
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and in the type of investors that buy equity and acquire control (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Some 
studies examined how these differences influence the outcomes of privatization.  
Degree of privatization. A study of privatizations in 59 countries between 1977 and 1997 
revealed that only 11.5% of the firms were fully privatized; less than 30% sold more than half 
through IPO (Jones et al.,1999). Later studies shown how the majority of privatization 
processes around the world continues to be partial, leaving the government with a minority or 
majority stake (Gupta, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007). Only a small number of 
studies on the impact of privatization on performance, however, acknowledged this distinction 
(Megginson & Sutter, 2006). Those that did, found mixed support for the theoretical prediction 
that fully privatized enterprises would outperform partially state-owned ones (Megginson, 
2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
Partial privatization, some scholars argued, may lead to improve monitoring, but, to the 
extent that a firm remains under government control, managers may still be subject to political 
interference. Other scholars warned that combining partial privatization with full managerial 
control may cause serious governance problems whereby, in the absence of effective oversight, 
private investors may manage the enterprise to maximize their own benefits, for instance, 
through skimming the top line rather than the bottom line (Munir & Naqvi, 2017).  
Megginson’s (2005) observation that, within the banking sector, fully privatized enterprises 
outperform partially privatized ones offered initial support this idea. Later studies, using large 
samples across multiple countries and industries, corroborated the assumption that privatized 
firms with high residual state ownership would exhibit lower financial performance (Boubakri, 
Cosset & Guedhami, 2009; Boubakri, Guedhami, Kwok, & Saffar, 2016). Greve and Man 
Zhang (2017) also showed how partially privatized firms (listed on the stock exchange but not 
entirely independent from the State) are less likely to engage in market-oriented M&As, 
making them less likely to maximize their financial returns.  
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Other studies, however, revealed a positive influence of residual state ownership on 
financial performance (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Researchers explain these observations 
through the fact that in industries associated with large-scale infrastructural projects, partial 
state ownership can help reduce risk (Doh, Teegen & Mudambi, 2004) and signal political 
support for managerial initiatives (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Also, large-scale studies on the 
impact of partial privatization acknowledge that while, on average, full privatization tends to 
be associated with higher performance, the presence of “sound institutional and political 
environments” – in the form of strong rule of law and low corruption in the political system – 
seems to mitigate the negative impact of residual state ownership (Boubakri et al., 2009, p.368).  
Type of owners. Some scholars also explored the moderating effects of the type of investors 
that acquire ownership and control of newly privatized firms. By studying Chinese 
privatizations, Wang and Judge (2012), for instance, showed that managerial ownership (i.e.  
percentage of shares owned by managers) tends to improve performance more than openly 
selling shares on the stock exchange. They argue that in economies transitioning from 
centralized planning to market control, internal incentives to managers may be more effective 
than external market mechanisms. Internal incentives, however, seem to be effective only at 
the managerial level, as D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash (2001) found that partially privatized 
firms with lower employee ownership and a higher state ownership (or a higher degree of 
foreign ownership) tend to display comparatively stronger profitability gains.  
Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005) tracked post-privatization ownership structure and 
its determinants across 32 countries, which they describe as developing, and found that the 
positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries that 
have weak investor protection, and that – contrary to other studies – ownership by domestic 
investors tends to be associated with higher performance. In contrast, other studies (e.g. Estrin 
et al., 2009; Uhlenbruck & Castro, 2000) have shown a more positive effect of foreign investors 
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on firm performance; this was typically the case of firms in transitioning economies acquired 
by large foreign multinationals and integrated into their international system of operations. 
Institutional context and the impact of residual state ownership on performance. 
Research on economic systems may help us shed further light on how the institutional context 
may shape decisions about retaining residual shareholding in privatized firms, and their 
implications, with a particular focus on what scholars initially labelled as “developing” and/or 
“transitional” economies. While acknowledging the usefulness of the framework presented 
earlier (Hall & Soskice, 2001) to differentiate countries in the Western hemisphere, scholars 
have criticised this classification for failing to appreciate the variety of configurations in what 
were previously labelled as developing economies. To address this issue, Fainshmidt and 
colleagues (2018) proposed a typology comprising seven distinct, empirically derived national 
institutional systems (Fainshmidt et al., 2018). 
An application of this framework, for instance, can help explain divergence in the 
performance outcomes of privatization in what Fainshmidt and colleagues refer to as 
“collaborative agglomerations” and “state-led configuration” by highlighting the differential 
impact of residual state ownership in the two systems. Collaborative agglomerations is a label 
used to group eight economies within Eastern Europe (e.g. Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary), 
who, after transitioning to a free market economy, developed economic systems where the state 
plays a developmental role by  investing into industrial sectors, ownership is not highly 
concentrated but must coordinate with labour nevertheless; although they can be considered 
still emerging, they share many characteristics with traditional CME’s (e.g. Germany), while 
being more focused on growth than on welfare programs (Fainshmidt et al., 2018). The notion 
of state-led configuration, conversely, includes 15 countries (e.g. Russia, China, India) that 
share similarities despite having different political regimes. In these countries, the state takes 
an active and direct role in the economic ordering of society, and political networks are a key 
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mechanism through which economic activities are conducted. Although family ownership is 
present, the dominant role of the state implies that these families are closely tied to the state.  
Although evidence from collaborative agglomerations has shown that fully privatized 
enterprises tend to outperform partially privatized ones, studies from countries that operate 
within state-led configurations seem to show more mixed results (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). 
This could be explained by the different role that the state plays in the economy in the two 
types of countries. Within state-led configurations, the state tends to keep a share of ownership 
in the best performing enterprises (Fainshmidt et al., 2018) and to intervene in the economy by 
favouring certain enterprises (e.g. awarding projects, financing, adapting regulation etc.) over 
others. In these configurations, therefore, partial state-ownership may not necessarily hamper 
performance, as performance enhancements arising from political advantages may well 
outweigh the performance decrease associated with political interference. 
TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Our review of the vast literature on privatization challenges some long-standing 
assumptions about the implications of a shift from public to private ownership and offers a 
more nuanced and contextualized understanding of this widespread phenomenon (see Table 1 
for a summary of our results). The decision to privatize seems to be driven more often by 
budgetary needs than a genuine desire to improve the efficiency of state-run services. In 
particular, considerable variation can be observed, across countries as well as industries, in the 
impact of privatization on the governance, structure, systems, strategy, culture, and 
performance of SOEs. All of this questions the assumption that transfer of ownership to private 
investors, per se, will lead to organizational change, improved financial performance, service 
quality, innovation output, and international expansion. These conclusions are in line with a 
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review of recent studies in finance (Megginson, 2017)4 and a meta-analysis of research on post-
privatization performance (Bachiller, 2017).  
---Insert Table 1. About here--- 
In fact, as Table 1 shows, past studies produced mixed results and whether privatization will 
actually deliver these results seem to largely depend on the presence of factors such as 
competitive pressures (e.g., Bortolotti et al., 2002; Cubbin & Stern, 2006), well-functioning 
incentive systems (Whitley & Czaban, 1998, Rodriguez et al., 2007), governance mechanisms 
(e.g., Peng, Buck, Filatotchev, 2003; Uhlenbruck & Castro, 2000) and regulatory frameworks 
(e.g., Zhang, et al., 2008; Ogden & Watson, 1999), and the availability of managerial expertise 
(Soulsby & Clark, 1996). In the absence of these conditions, instead, privatization may fail to 
address bureaucracy and inertia, or simply transfer lucrative economic activities to private 
investors with no appreciable improvement for the public (Munir & Naqvi, 2017).  
 These observations highlight the importance of a contextualized understanding of 
privatization – one that acknowledges the influence of various factors at organizational, 
industry, and societal level on the outcome of privatization. In this section, we outline some 
avenues for future research that build on insights produced by our review.   
Taking a Holistic View of Privatization 
Past research has rarely examined antecedents and outcomes of privatization 
simultaneously.  Therefore, while we know that different factors may weigh in on the decision 
to privatize, and that this decision may impact a range of outcomes, we know less about how 
the motives driving the decision influence the outcome of the process.  
Our review clearly shows that not all privatizations are necessarily motivated by the desire 
to make SOEs more efficient – as typical micro-economic arguments would seem to suggest 
(Milhaupt & Pargendler, 2017; Vickers & Yarrow, 1991). Indeed, some privatizations are 
driven by a need to pay off foreign or domestic debt (Ramamurti, 1992), while others are 
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motivated by political expediency, or the desire to enrich cronies who can then add to the 
coffers of the ruling party’s fund for the next election. This is particularly the case in developing 
countries, where an ideological bias is often also evident in such transactions (Munir & Naqvi, 
2017). In such cases, goal posts can be moved post-privatization to claim success. For example, 
higher post-privatization profitability can be attributed to the transaction’s ‘success’ even when 
it is clearly due to a highly favourable regulatory regime instituted particularly for this purpose.  
Our review should encourage future researchers to take a holistic view of privatization 
transactions. Rather than simply assessing the consequences of privatizations, it would be 
advisable to look at the motivations, the justifications for privatizing particular organizations, 
and the goals that are set at the time. Then these can be compared to actual outcomes post-
privatization. Such a perspective would take into account the dynamic nature of such 
transactions, where concessions are made as the transaction proceeds or unravels. This is 
critical since, almost by definition, privatizations tend to be intensely political affairs.  
How do governments’ motives to privatize affect the process and its outcome? How do the 
different concessions and/or contractual agreements associated with the sale influence the 
performance of newly privatized firms? How do changes in regulatory regime shape the 
success and failure of privatizations? These are only some of the possible research avenues that 
future scholars taking a more holistic view can explore. Addressing such questions is likely to 
shed new light on this important phenomenon, and indeed, results in studies that are more 
comprehensive and balanced 
Temporal Lag and the Assessment of Privatization Outcomes   
When examining the outcomes of privatization, in order to isolate the impact of ownership 
change from other effects, most studies tend to explore organizational implications, such as 
performance, innovation, or employment, shortly after privatization (Megginson & Netter, 
2001). Research on performance outcomes, for instance, generally compared performance 2 to 
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3 years before and 2 to 3 years after privatization (e.g. Estrin et al., 2009; Megginson & Netter, 
2001; Munir & Naqvi, 2017). Similarly, studies exploring the mediating processes of 
privatization generally focused on events occurring either during or shortly (2 to 4 years) after 
the privatization has occurred (Soulsby & Clark, 1996; Whitley & Czaban, 1998). 
Despite the methodological benefits of such an approach, studies have shown that the 
implications of privatization tend not to manifest themselves immediately. Instead, they often 
become apparent over a longer period of time. For instance, studies exploring the impact of 
privatization on innovation have shown that a shift to private ownership may not have an 
immediate impact on R&D performance, but this performance will increase over a long period 
of time (Munari & Oriani, 2005). Similarly, studies exploring the mediating processes have 
revealed that despite initial resistance, organizational members frequently become more 
receptive of internal changes induced by privatization over a longer period of time (e.g. 
Mackenzie, 2008; Ross, 2008). Examining the implications of privatization with different 
temporal lags may importantly affect the conclusions we draw from these results.  
Do different outcomes of privatization manifest with different temporal lags? Is there an 
optimal timing and pace for the implementation of change after (or possibly before) 
privatization? Future research should pay more attention to long-term organizational 
implications of privatization, differentiate between the short-term and long-term effects (and 
adjust the temporal window of observation accordingly), and begin to examine in more depth 
temporal aspects of the pre- and post-privatization process.  
Privatization and Organizational Change Processes 
Several past studies have investigated changes – in systems, structure, culture and strategy – 
resulting from privatization. With a few exceptions these studies have been largely static in 
nature – that is comparing snapshots of organizational features before and after privatization 
(e.g. Cragg & Dyck, 2003; Soulsby & Clark, 1995) – and/or reflecting a relatively narrow 
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theoretical perspective, as they aimed at corroborating or rejecting predictions from micro-
economic theories (e.g. Erakovic & Wilson, 2005; Rodriguez et al., 2007). There appears to be 
a tremendous need for more processual accounts of these changes.  
Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) widely used framework to organize change-process theories 
into four types – teleological, dialectic, life cycle, and evolutionary – may offer an excellent 
starting point. The vast majority of research on change after privatization seems to assume an 
implicit “teleological” model. Teleological models portray change as being driven by 
purposeful decisions aimed at pursuing well defined goals – which in the case of privatization 
highlights changes in incentive systems, organizational structure, managerial positions, etc. 
aimed at increasing efficiency of profitability. Adopting this perspective leads to a view of the 
privatization process primarily as sequence of steps motivated by the pursuit of a new set of 
goals. This pursuit is resisted by endogenous and exogenous forces that often prevent or delay 
the ultimate achievement of these goals. 
 Exploring other perspectives on change may help illuminate other important, but less 
studied aspects of the process. How does the interaction among different actors (political 
authorities, executives, trade unions, local communities, etc.) involved in the privatization 
process shape its outcome? Dialectic theories of change posit that change results from a 
synthesis of conflicting forces (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Rather than assuming that change 
efforts will overcome resistance, or vice versa, a dialectical perspective highlights alternate 
arrangement that are produced as opposing forces negotiate, compromise or discover 
opportunities for mutual enrichment. Adopting such a perspective on change may help scholars 
shed new light, for instance, on how newly privatized enterprises with residual state ownership 
manage to reconcile the co-existence of different imperatives (or “logics”). Likewise, they can 
shed light on how old and new interest groups shape the redesign and functioning of 
governance mechanisms and organizational systems in former state-owned firms. 
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In contrast, Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) third type, life-cycle theories, reveals how, in 
some cases, change occurs as a typical sequence of stages, and they highlight the mechanisms 
driving progression from one stage to the next (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Can we conceive 
of privatization as a multi-stage process? Do different types of SOEs go through different paths 
as they are privatized? Johnson and colleagues (Johnson et al., 2000) offer a rare example of 
the application of a life-cycle perspective to privatization, as they highlight an intermediate 
stage where both private and public templates co-exist, before the organization finally 
transitions to operating like a private entity. Future research may build on this idea and 
examine, for instance, whether SOEs operating in different types of industries or institutional 
contexts experience different stages after privatization or investigate the conditions that 
facilitate or delay progression through these stages.  
The Moderating Role of Owner Identity  
Our review highlights that the general assumption that a shift to private ownership per se leads 
to better performance may be overly simplistic, and that reality is more nuanced. This view, 
for instance, fails to acknowledge that not all private owners are equally equipped to reform 
SOEs. This is particularly important when SOEs are sold to the highest bidder. What type of 
private owners may be best positioned to restructure a former SOEs, timely and effectively, for 
higher efficiency (possibly without compromising on other aspects, such as service quality or 
access)? Few studies have examined the influence of the specific characteristics of the acquirer 
on the outcome of privatization. Those who did focused on the concentration of ownership 
after privatization – a relatively easy characteristic to measure. Results in this regard, however, 
seem to be mixed, primarily because of a second, related point: the modality of privatization 
can be a huge moderator when it comes to outcomes. While floating a company on the stock 
market – effectively entrusting it in the hands of a multitude of shareholders – generally seems 
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to be more beneficial than direct sale to a single one (Bachiller, 2017), some studies have found 
a direct correlation between ownership concentration and performance (Boubakri et al., 2005).  
While ownership concentration determines the power of owners to enforce goals, owner 
identity determines the preferences and goals of owners (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). For 
instance, the performance and functioning of a privatized firm is likely to differ if the new 
owner is an ‘oligarch’ (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005) or a foreign multinational corporation 
(Rondinelli & Black, 2000) answerable to shareholders and with a reputation at stake. Financial 
institutions (e.g. banks, pension funds, investment companies etc.) are another case in point. 
They are usually considered as portfolio investors whose main objective is shareholder wealth 
maximization. However, their preferences might differ depending on the state’s oversight of 
their core business, or the involvement of various actors in it. While banks might be in favour 
of post-privatization downsizing in order to improve efficiency and maximize their returns, 
pension funds are often linked to governments and trade unions, which makes them more 
sensitive to political concerns like employment levels and job security (Woidtke, 2002).  
These studies generally suggest that owners differ in terms of knowledge, goals, wealth 
constraints or political interests, and that such difference are likely to influence the way in 
which they exercise their right as owners, with important consequences for post-privatization 
behaviour and performance (Estrin et al., 2009; Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). Future research, 
therefore, should pay more attention not only to the concentration of ownership, but also to the 
identity and associated characteristics of relevant owners, asking questions such as How do 
different types of owners shape the transformation of privatized organizations? How do their 





Privatization: An Institutional Perspective 
The privatization process has a number of aspects that an institutionalist approach may help 
shed more light on. Neo-institutional theorists are concerned with finding out how new norms 
are established, different meanings created, and various practices accorded legitimacy 
(Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). Institutional theory illuminates how regulation is not the only 
force determining an organization’s actions. Apart from regulation, norms and cognitive 
understandings provide equally powerful and perhaps more deeply entrenched devices to 
influence organizational dynamics (Scott, 1995). These forces, institutional theorists point out, 
promote converging behaviour among organizations in an industry (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Isomorphic pressures, however, are not all powerful, and some divergence will likely 
remain in the strategies that competitors adopt, and/or in how they organize internal resources. 
Our review indicates that some of these differences can be explained in terms private vs. public 
ownership (e.g. Greve & Man Zhang, 2017; Johnson et al., 2000). An interesting question, 
therefore, becomes do isomorphic pressures affect state-owned vs. privately owned firms 
differently? One could argue, for instance, that because of political backing and the deep 
pockets of the state, state-owned firms may be better positioned to resist coercive isomorphic 
pressures. Political constraints and social obligations may prevent state-owned enterprises from 
imitating efficient practices of industry leaders. By viewing themselves as fundamentally 
different, they may also be less prone to imitate private competitors. In fact, their public 
ownership may locate them at the intersection of different fields, and subject them to different, 
countervailing isomorphic pressures. These, however, are just speculations. More empirical 
work is needed to improve our understanding of whether and how privatization affects how 
firms respond to isomorphic pressures. 
Institutionalism represents a powerful lens to understand both the effect of the institutional 
environment on the process and outcome of a privatization and the internal turmoil that 
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organizations may experience post-privatization. How do members negotiate the cultural shift 
from a public sector to a private sector logic? How do privatized public service providers 
manage internal tensions between their historical imperative to provide a public service, and 
the new economic imperative to deliver profit? How do informal institutions – such as societal-
level cultural norms and assumptions about appropriate organizational goals and practices – 
influence post-privatization changes? Adopting an institutional lens may help us illuminate 
how privatizations can be motivated and justified in ideological terms (Kentikelenis & Babb, 
2019), and how different imperatives, e.g., public interest vs. shareholder wealth maximization, 
can collide in recently privatized organizations (Johnson et al., 2000).   
Privatization, Resilience and Crisis Response 
Our review shows how past research on the outcomes of privatization has overwhelmingly 
concentrated on financial and operating performance, reflecting a focus on the impact of this 
transition on the firms themselves rather their broader constituents. Possibly resting on the 
neoclassical economics assumption that the pursuit of the interest of private firms (or, rather, 
their shareholders) will be beneficial for society at large, these studies have sidestepped broader 
considerations, such as public interest, when focusing on the efficiency or profitability of these 
firms (Jupe & Funnell, 2015; Kentikelenis & Babb, 2019; Munir & Naqvi, 2017). 
This is not to question the importance of the long-term economic viability of a firm – be it 
state-owned or privately owned. Privatization programs around the world, however, have often 
transferred to private investors firms and/or assets involved in the production and delivery of 
services considered of public utility (Barley, 2007; Miranda & Lerner, 1995). This transfer has 
often occurred in the absence of viable market structures or regulatory oversight that would 
ensure effective delivery or affordable access, and prevent private operators from designing 
their operations – be it the type of services they offer, the modalities of their delivery, or the 
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cost at the which are delivered – to maximize their own interest rather that the interest of the 
constituents they are expected to serve (Roland, 2008; Kentikelenis & Babb, 2019). 
The Covid-19 pandemic has thrown the implications of these situations into stark relief. In 
the United Kingdom, entrusting private firms with the stockpiling of emergency medical 
equipment resulted in poor inventory management and delayed delivery (Lawrence, Garside, 
Pegg, Conn, Carrell, & Davies, 2020), and the outsourcing of the Covid-19 helpline to private 
contractors has been blamed for inadequate assistance and unnecessary deaths (Conn, 2020). 
In the Italian region of Lombardy, ample reliance on private health care resulted in a shortage 
of intensive care units and testing labs (Munster, 2020). Political choices justified by expected 
cost savings or quality improvements revealed their inadequacy to handle emergencies, as 
public structures had to step in to compensate for private operations designed primarily to 
benefit from the lucrative opportunities that they had been afforded. 
The Covid-19 pandemic, we argue, should encourage scholars to revisit the implications of 
privatization – broadly understood – setting aside the widely studied issue of whether and how 
privatization improves efficiency, to examine instead the consequences of privatization on the 
overall resilience of a system in face of crises. How do public vs. private service providers 
respond to systemic emergencies that require to temporarily sacrifice profitability to the 
common good? Under what conditions can privatized services be brought back under state 
control? What are the implications of privatizing services that are intended to be activated only 
in case of emergency? What are the challenges (and opportunities) that private and public 
providers encounter as they try to collaborate to address a collective emergency? The Covid-
19 pandemic, in this respect, offers an extraordinary opportunity for comparative research on 
the implications of different choices – within and across countries – about the allocation of 
responsibility for the delivery of critical services – such as health care, social care, or 
emergency response – to different combinations of public vs. private entities.  
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CONCLUSION 
As mentioned above, the Covid-19 pandemic has put privatization back in the public eye. 
Support for a resilient and robust public sector seems to have risen, just as questions about the 
primacy of shareholder wealth maximization above everything else – declining employment or 
employee help in times of distress – have started to be asked. A new consensus around a more 
balanced and stable economy seems to be forming. At a time like this, it is crucially important 
to take stock of what we know about privatization.  
Our review provides a foundation upon which a new body of work on privatization can 
build. In particular, our review has highlighted the importance of taking into account the 
institutional environment in which privatization takes place. This not only allows us to bring 
in regulatory regimes, political influence and corruption into the picture but also encourages us 
to focus on how different institutional logics come together inside the enterprise. 
Privatization can be a powerful device for increasing the competitiveness of economies. At 
the same time, if pursued for ideological or political reasons, it can lead to rent-seeking and 
general decrease in economic competitiveness of a country. If we do not take a balanced 
perspective, we can end up in a situation where profits are privatised while losses are socialized. 
We hope that our extensive review of research around this topic will allow for more informed 
research and practice.  
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NOTES 
1. For a detailed review of the privatization-performance relationship see Megginson & Netter, 2001; 
Megginson, 2017 and Bachiller, 2017 
2. It is worth noting, however, that these conclusions should be taken with caution, as governments tend 
to privatize through IPOs the largest and most promising enterprises, and to sell more “problematic” 
ones through other methods (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Megginson et al., 2005). 
3. CMEs, for instance, tend to have higher levels of membership in trade unions, and wage negotiations 
tend to happen at sectoral or national level. In contrast, workers in LMEs are often less organized, and 
wages are negotiated individually or at company level. While workers in CMEs tend to have more 
specific skillsets, tied to the firm or industry they work in, workers in LMEs have more general 
skillsets, transferable across different firms and industries  
4. Only six of the seventeen studies reviewed by Megginson (2017) show solid evidence of improvement 
in financial performance after privatization, whereas others offer less conclusive evidence, such as 
improvements limited only to 20% of the sample (Dinc & Gupta, 2011) or mostly attributable to financial 
restructuring prior to sales (Berger et al., 2005). Some of these studies also measure financial 
performance using relatively short-term changes in stock price, therefore capturing market assumptions 
and expectations rather the actual impact of privatization on operations (Li et al, 2016; Wolf & Pollitt, 
2008). In fact, several studies published in the same period, but not included in Megginson’s review, 
show either mixed or no improvement (e.g., Alexandre & Charreaux, 2004; Bozec, Dia, & Breton, 2006; 
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